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Abstract
Thinking skills in the context of Formal Logic, Informal Logic 
and Critical Thinking
The aim o f this essay is to explore the concept o f thinking skills in 
three different contexts, i.e. Formal Logic, Informal Logic and 
Critical Thinking. The essay traces some contemporary historical 
connections between these approaches and illustrates differences and 
overlap between them by referring to the content pages o f textbooks 
which are representative o f the different approaches. In evaluating 
the historical developments sketched in the essay, the conclusion is 
reached that the open and pragmatic way in which Critical Thinking 
handles the topic o f thinking skills has advantages for inter­
disciplinary contact and cooperation. However, this pragmatic 
approach also has a possible downside: the concept o f thinking skills 
can become so vague as to be o f no use.
1. Introduction
In this essay I shall explore the concept o f thinking skills in three different 
contexts, i.e. Formal Logic (FL), Informal Logic (IL) and Critical 
Thinking (CT) . In doing so, I shall highlight the historical connections
19 This essay is a re-worked version of a paper presented at the Annual Conference of 
the PSSA, Durban, July 1994. I am indebted to referees who have made useful 
suggestions to improve the essay.
20 Formal Logic is abbreviated as FL, Informal Logic as IL and Critical Thinking as 
CT.
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between these disciplines by way o f a narrative.
I could begin my story with the ancient Greeks, or at the Beginning of 
Everything (en arché en ho logos, John says in John 1:1). However, I 
shall commence my story at the beginning o f the 20th century. In the final 
paragraph o f the essay I shall give a short evaluation o f the historical 
developments which I have narrated.
Before starting off with the narrative, a few remarks on the term thinking 
skills seem in order here. For the purposes o f my story I shall take this 
term to mean the following: thinking skills are acquired cognitive 
operations in the execution o f which a person can attain high levels of 
proficiency. Which cognitive operations are relevant in the present 
context will become clear in the course o f this essay. (However, I do not 
claim to give a complete list.) The cognitive operations in question are 
associated with logic, and have been regarded by many philosophers as the 
‘core skills’ o f the Western tradition o f rationality which was initiated by 
the ancient Greek philosophers.
2. Formal Logic
In the first decade o f the 20th century a more or less successful marriage 
was established between mathematics and logic in Whitehead and 
Russell’s Principia Mathematica. At that stage it became possible to give 
complete definitions o f the logical meaning o f certain so-called logical 
operators’ (e.g. and, or, i f .. then) and to generate conclusive proof of 
validity for a certain class o f deductively valid inferences from a set of 
axioms and rules. The semantics and syntax o f the artificial language 
which mathematical logic uses to construct valid forms o f inference is 
completely transparent and is not connected in any way to empirical 
content or psychological processes. For this reason mathematical logic 
has been acclaimed as an autonomous science which has at long last
21 This interesting option has already been tried out by Hegel (1971:31).
22 Whether the equation of rationality with ‘logicality’ is a fundamental mistake, as 
Toulmin (1972:44) thinks it is, cannot be discussed within the limits of this essay.
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emancipated Logic from Epistemology and Psychology.
The truth table method or alternatively the proof-theoretic method of 
mathematical logic can be used to test arguments in natural languages 
(e.g. Afrikaans and English) for validity. In order to do this, arguments in 
a natural language have to be translated into the artificial language of 
mathematical logic. The following argument can serve as illustration:
• Argument in natural language:
If it rains it is wet 
It rains
Therefore it is wet
• Argument translated into artificial language:
R d W
R
W
Because mathematical logic is an extremely powerful instrument for the 
study o f forms o f deductive inference, it has been regarded by many 
people as the ‘last word’ on logic. This view has had important 
implications for the teaching o f thinking skills in logic courses and for the 
contents o f textbooks on logic. Because mathematical logic is an 
instrument for the study o f deductive inference, textbooks have tended to 
emphasize deductive inference and the skills associated with it.
In the context o f mathematical logic ‘thinking skills’ imply the following:
i) The manipulation o f symbols in accordance with a set o f rules. These 
rules consist o f a number o f argument forms and statements o f logical 
equivalence. When applied to a given argument, these rules sanction 
steps o f deductive reasoning proceeding from the premises to the 
conclusion o f the argument. Such a completed sequence o f deductive 
reasoning steps validates the argument.
23 See for instance Scholz (1961:71 -2).
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ii) The translation (or rather transformation) o f sentences in natural 
language into ‘well-formed formulas’, i.e. sentences which conform to 
the rules o f the syntax o f the artificial language.
The new mathematical logic did not completely displace the traditional 
formal logic, which has derived from Aristotle and has been developed and 
refined during the Middle Ages and in modem times. This so-called 
syllogistic or categorical logic is based on the relations between classes of 
objects.
• The following argument is a typical example o f a syllogism:
All M are P
S is M
Therefore S is P
•  An instance o f this pattern is the following argument:
All human beings are mortal
Socrates is a human being
Therefore Socrates is mortal
This argument is an expression, in syllogistic form, o f a conventional 
formulation such as ‘Socrates, being human, is mortal’.
A certain class o f arguments in conventional argumentative discourse 
which does not already exhibit a syllogistic form can be expressed in such 
a form. By applying the rules which govern the valid forms o f the 
syllogism, it can be ascertained whether a specific argument form is valid 
or not. There are eleven valid forms o f the syllogism.
In the context o f syllogistic logic the following are important thinking 
skills:
i) The application o f  the rules o f valid syllogistic reasoning by 
straightforward inspection procedures which enables one to make a 
definitive decision on whether a specific syllogism is valid or invalid.
ii) The translation o f nonstandard forms o f argument into syllogistic 
form.
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At this stage a glance at the content pages o f two logic textbooks which 
have been widely used could be useful. One dates from the late 20s and 
the other from the middle 60s. Excluded from the content summaries 
below are headings concerning terms, their intention and extension, 
categorical propositions, and other subjects belonging to the propadeutic 
o f formal logic.
R. Latta & A. Macbeath: S.F. Barker:
The Elem ents o f  Logic The Elements o f  Logic
(1929-1956) (1965-1985)
The Categorical Syllogism The Logic o f Categorical Inferences
The Figures and Moods of the The Logic of Truth Functions
Syllogism... Monadic Quantification
Conditional Reasonings General Quantification
Syllogism and Deduction Fallacies
The Validity o f the Syllogism Inductive Reasoning
The Problem o f Induction Applying Logical Principles
Observation, Enumeration and [Enthymemes, reasoning by
Analogy analogy, rhetoric]
The Inductive Methods
The Method of Hypothesis
Fallacies
As can be seen from the content headings o f Barker’s book the new and 
powerful mathematical logic does not displace the traditional syllogistic 
logic, although predicate logic is capable o f handling the class of
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arguments treated by syllogistic logic. The main reason for this state of 
affairs is not the power o f tradition (although it certainly does have an 
effect) but certain limitations o f mathematical logic (to which I will return 
shortly).
In both books mentioned above deductive reasoning receives priority (and 
also gets the larger part o f the print). Inductive reasoning is treated as a 
necessary complement to deductive reasoning because o f the important 
role it plays in scientific research. Inductive reasoning plays second fiddle 
to the logic o f deductive reasoning because, unlike the latter, which limits 
itself to determinate form s o f arguments and (in the case o f mathematical 
logic) employs a set o f rules which is demonstrably complete, inductive 
logic is not an ‘exact’ and ‘systematic’ discipline. Indeterminate back­
ground information and methods o f data acquisition affect inductive 
reasoning. Those are the main reasons why inductive reasoning is often 
introduced in textbooks under the heading ‘The problem o f induction’.
The following main topics are traditionally treated under this heading: 
induction by enumeration, induction by elimination (Mill’s methods) and 
argument by analogy. The context in which these types o f inductive 
reasoning are usually treated is ‘scientific inquiry’ (Welton & Monahan, 
1962:337-413; Latta & Macbeath, 1956:299-347). Textbooks on logic 
traditionally contain shorter or longer sections on ‘informal fallacies’ 
because arguments in natural language may be incorrect not because they 
have an invalid form but because o f (e.g.) irrelevance or semantic in­
consistency.
In the context o f inductive reasoning the following ‘thinking skills’ are of 
some importance: the application o f certain criteria in order to determine 
how strong the support is which the premis(es) give to the conclusion o f a 
specific argument, and determining the relevance o f the premises in 
relation to the conclusion o f an argument.
Identification and criticism o f fallacies by using criteria such as relevance
24 This is also the case with Welton and Monahan’s Intermediate Logic (19384- 
1962). A more recent textbook which also contains a section on syllogistic logic is 
Rafalko’s Logic for an Overcast Tuesday (1990).
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and semantic inconsistency may also count as ‘thinking skills’ in the 
context of nondeductive logic.
To summarize: when the standard content o f textbooks on logic is taken 
into consideration, it may be said that the most important thinking skills 
taught in mathematical logic are skills o f deductive reasoning. In mathe­
matical logic such skills consist o f the manipulation o f argument forms 
and statements o f logical equivalence in order to produce proofs of 
validity. Associated with this kind o f deductive reasoning is the trans­
lation o f statements in natural language into formulae o f the artificial 
language o f mathematical logic. In syllogistic logic the most important 
thinking skills consist o f the application o f the rules o f valid syllogistic 
reasoning to ascertain whether a specific syllogism conforms to the rules 
(i.e. is valid), and in the transformation o f nonstandard forms o f argument 
into syllogistic form. As to inductive reasoning, the most important 
thinking skills consist o f  the application o f criteria such as those which 
determine measure o f support, relevance and semantic consistency. Basic 
skills which are a prerequisite for the execution o f the complex operations 
mentioned above, are also taught in standard logic textbooks: these are 
(inter alia) identification o f arguments in natural language discourse and 
analysis o f arguments into their basic constituents o f premises and 
conclusions.
3. Informal Logic/Logic of natural language
The limitations o f formal logic (syllogistic logic and mathematical logic) 
which become apparent when it is called upon to handle argumentation in 
natural language in a comprehensive way, has motivated lecturers, 
theorists and textbook authors to seek an alternative approach. Since the
course relevant to everyday 
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late 60s there is an Informal Logic ‘movement’ which articulates an 
important shift in logicians’ conception o f ‘thinking skills’ and the 
teaching o f such skills to students. This shift can be characterized as a 
shift away from ‘synthetic’ arguments which only fill in the variables of 
formal logic, and towards authentic argumentative discourse in everyday 
life (e.g. in politics, religion, court cases, advertisements, popular 
scientific writing, etc.). One example o f a ‘synthetic’ argument which is 
used in a logic exercise may suffice in the present context:
Grandmothers don’t go in for surfing. Surfers go in for sunbathing. So 
sunbathers sometimes aren’t grandmothers (Barker, 1985:76).
The limitations o f formal logic and the thinking skills associated with it 
become apparent when one tries to construct a logic o f ‘everyday’ 
argumentative discourse:
* In ‘everyday’ argumentative discourse most o f the arguments we 
use do not exhibit valid forms, nor are they meant to. More often 
than not, when they are valid, their validity does not depend on the 
logical form they exhibit but on the semantics o f the words and 
phrases o f the natural language in which they are formulated. 
‘Everyday’ argumentative discourse which is not formally valid can 
only be made valid by a transformation o f the original discourse, 
which involves a greater or lesser degree o f distortion.
* Translation o f natural language into the artificial language of 
mathematical logic is not without problems, and it always remains 
problematical whether the author o f a specific argument would 
concur with the interpretation given o f his/her statements in the 
artificial language.
* On the level o f deductive reasoning formal logic has some important 
limitations. Syllogistic logic is limited to categorical propositions. 
In the case o f mathematical logic failure to construct a proof of 
validity cannot be considered sufficient grounds to conclude that the 
argument in question is invalid. The proof-theoretic method is thus
and read about race, pollution, poverty, sex, atomic warfare, the population 
explosion, and all the other problems faced by the human race in the second half of 
the twentieth century”.
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unable to conclusively invalidate an argument; it is only able to 
definitely validate one. This is the main reason why syllogistic 
logic has not been completely displaced by mathematical logic: the 
method of the former consists in the application o f a few rules in a 
mechanical manner and it can both validate and invalidate 
syllogistic arguments. Although the truth table method is a 
mechanical procedure which can validate or invalidate an argument 
conclusively, it is too cumbersome to use when an argument form 
has five or more variables. The proof-theoretic method is for all 
practical purposes non-mechanical: everybody who has attempted a 
construction of a complicated argument knows that one proceeds by 
trial and error and that a great deal o f ingenuity is often called for.
While the formal logic approach focuses on valid forms o f reasoning, the 
informal logic approach studies the structure o f arguments in documented 
‘everyday’ discourse. Monroe Beardsley’s Practical Logic (1950) set the 
standard for this type o f analysis by using arrow diagrams to make the 
structure o f arguments in natural language explicit. The function o f arrow 
diagrams is to make the connections between the premises and the 
conclusion o f an argument explicit. For example:
4
CD + CD
I
CD
The encircled numbers stand for statements in a specific passage of 
argumentative discourse, and the arrows indicate the relation o f support 
between premises and conclusion. In the example above statements 1 and
2 together support statement 3, which is an intermediate conclusion. 
Statements 3 and 4 together function as premises which support statement 
5, the final conclusion.
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In the context o f informal logic the following are important thinking skills:
i) Identifying discourse in natural language as argumentative, and 
isolating the argument from the discourse which does not belong to it 
(e.g. asides, incidental information, etc.).
ii) Clarifying the meaning o f the discourse (if necessary), i.e. making 
decisions about vague or obscure language and ambiguous terms with 
due consideration o f the context of the argument.
iii) Structuring the argument in the standard form and representing the 
structure by way o f a diagram which makes clear how the premises 
are connected to each other and to the conclusion.
iv) Supplying tacit premises and conclusions.
v) Employing some technique or other to make the structure o f extended 
arguments explicit.
The informal logic approach does not only want to make the structure of 
arguments in natural language explicit, but also wants to evaluate 
arguments. In FL the range o f evaluation criteria is (strictly speaking) 
limited to validity and invalidity. The form o f an argument is either valid 
or invalid with no degrees in between. In IL it has become standard 
practice to extend evaluation to the premises o f arguments with questions 
concerning acceptability and relevance. Acceptability depends on a 
variety o f criteria, e.g. observation, background knowledge and expertise. 
Evaluative criteria used in connection with the support rendered by 
premises to conclusions o f arguments are strong/weak, plausible, cogent 
etc. In this particular context thinking skills consist o f the following:
vi) The application o f criteria such as relevance and expertise regarding 
premises, and strength o f support regarding the relation between the 
premises and the conclusions o f arguments.
Because the majority o f  arguments in natural language are not deductive 
arguments, IL gives priority to inductive reasoning, and also most o f the 
print. This point can be illustrated by a summary o f the contents pages o f 
two IL textbooks which may be regarded as representative o f the IL 
approach:
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I.M. Copi:
Inform al Logic (1986)
S.N. Thomas:
Practical Reasoning in N atural 
Language (1986, T hird  Edition)
Introduction [Argument structure, Basic Analysis o f Reasoning
diagrams] [Argument structure, diagrams]
Some Uses o f Language Basic Evaluation o f Reasoning
Fallacies Clarifying Obscure Reasoning
Definition Practical Decision Making
Analogy Traditional Topics [Fallacies]
Causal Connections [Mill’s Analyzing Media Editorials
methods]
Analyzing Philosophical Reasoning
Science and Hypothesis
Even superficial comparison o f the formal logic approach with the 
informal logic approach by way of the contents o f the textbooks 
summarized above is enough to highlight the implications o f the shift 
towards reasoning in natural language. The main topics o f the latter 
concern language and the structure o f short and extended arguments.
However, it is also clear from such a comparison that there is overlap to a 
certain extent. The formal approach has more often than not sup­
plemented the study o f logical form with expositions on inductive 
reasoning and fallacies. The importance o f the latter has generally 
increased in IL textbooks. Moreover, IL is not as ‘informal’ as the name 
suggests. The notion o f validity in IL tends to be intuitive and imprecise 
to the extent that it is dissociated from the forms o f arguments and made 
to depend on the meaning or semantic content o f all the words and phrases 
that appear in the premises and conclusion o f an argument. Validity (or 
invalidity) in this sense is determined by asking the question: “Supposing 
the reason(s) were true, is there any way in which the conclusion could be 
false?” (Thomas, 1986:134). It is clear that the inability to answer ‘yes’
26 See Thomas (1986:12).
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to this question does not conclusively validate an argument (for the 
inability might be due to lack o f imagination on the part o f the person 
trying to answer the question). Because o f this limitation o f the semantic 
notion o f validity, and because some arguments in natural language do 
exhibit valid logical forms, most IL textbooks do treat basic forms o f valid 
reasoning and some o f the thinking skills associated with the formal 
approach.
4. Critical thinking
Critical Thinking is a term which came into circulation in the USA in the 
40s. Sometimes the names Informal Logic and Critical Thinking are used 
interchangeably for an academic discipline. In my view, however, there 
are important differences which militate against this usage. In the first 
place it is a historical fact that there are two ‘movements’ which exist 
separately and independently o f each other. The Critical Thinking ‘move­
ment’ originated in the early 70s. While IL tends to define itself as an 
academic discipline and as an enlargement o f the scope o f logic, CT 
defined itself from the start as an instrument o f  educational reform on all 
levels o f  education: leaders in the Critical Thinking movement “have 
argued that effective and meaningful education requires that curricular, 
pedagogical and assessment strategies at all levels o f education be 
coordinated so as to foster in students those cognitive skills and habits 
associated with critical thinking” (Facione, 1991:1).
The term thinking skills came into vogue through the Critical Thinking 
movement. Thinking skills as a generic concept encompasses reasoning 
skills (which are the main concern o f FL and IL) as a sub-species. 
Thinking skills is a concept which is wide (and vague) enough to allow 
inputs from educationists, cognitive psychologists, rhetoricians and 
communication scientists into the Critical Thinking movement, which has 
acquired an interdisciplinary character. It is interesting to note that CT 
has created scope for interaction between Logic and Rhetoric, which have 
been sworn enemies for centuries.
The Critical Thinking movement has the aim to address three major 
problems o f the so-called post-modern era (roughly the post-70 
industrialized world), i.e. mass education, the information explosion, and 
the restructuring o f the economy.____________________________________
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Mass education in universities and colleges tends to reproduce a style of 
teaching and learning which can be found in most schools, i.e. the 
communication o f ‘facts’ to students, and rote learning and reproduction 
by the students. One o f the major aims o f the critical thinking movement 
is to abolish this style o f teaching and learning on all levels o f education 
by infusing critical thinking skills into the curriculum, into teaching and 
learning methods, and into assessment.
‘Teaching facts’, rote learning and reproduction cannot handle the 
information explosion: what people who are exposed to it need are 
thinking skills to cope with it. Educating people in the required skills is 
another major aim of the critical thinking movement.
The restructuring o f the economy, necessitated in industrialized countries 
by the pressures o f global competition and computer-driven production 
processes, tends to erase distinctions between ‘workers’ and ‘manage­
ment’. ‘Workers’ and ‘sta ff are suddenly in need o f a wide range of 
skills, e.g. decision-making skills, communication skills, planning skills, 
problem-solving skills, etc. All o f these skills are based on or contain a 
component o f thinking skills. Educating people to cope with the demands 
o f a post-industrial economy is the third major aim o f the Critical 
Thinking movement.
Notwithstanding the differences between CT and IL mentioned above, 
there is much overlap between them. As I have already mentioned, CT 
encompasses the reasoning skills mentioned above in the discussion o f IL, 
and shares with IL its focus on everyday argumentative discourse. CT, 
however, moves beyond the topics usually associated with IL in that an 
explicit distinction is made between a ‘cognitive skills’ dimension and a 
‘dispositional’ dimension to thinking. The latter dimension ties in with 
CT’s educational objectives which are (amongst others) to produce ‘good 
critical thinkers’ as opposed to ‘weak critical thinkers’:
Modeling that critical spirit, awakening and nurturing those attitudes in
students, exciting those inclinations and attempting to determine objectively
In 1992 the number of students enrolled in colleges and universities in the USA for 
the first time equalled the number of pupils attending primary and secondary 
schools.
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if  they have become genuinely integrated with the high quality execution of 
CT skills are ... important instructional goals and legitimate targets for 
educational assessment (Facione, 1991:20).
The dispositions or attitudes in question here are (inter alia) open- 
mindedness regarding divergent views, flexibility in considering 
alternatives and opinions, reasonableness in selecting and applying 
criteria, and persistence when faced with difficulties (Facione, 1991:25).
Skills associated with reasoning count as ‘core CT skills’, but in this 
context they are viewed as ‘micro skills’. Micro skills function within 
‘macro skills’ like listening to or presenting a speech, writing an essay or 
reading an extended discourse, or even a book. CT tends to emphasize the 
constructive use o f skills more than IL does. In both FL and IL a 
tendency exists to use rules and criteria for good reasoning primarily for 
the evaluation o f discourse; CT tends to place a greater amount of 
emphasis on the use o f skills to generate various types o f discourse.
As a post-modern phenomenon CT is eclectic and ‘fuzzy’ in its 
composition, as is clear from the subjects in the contents o f two textbooks 
which may be regarded as representative o f the genre:
Some o f the chapter headings in the table op p. 441 are italicized to 
highlight construction (as opposed to evaluation) and the assimilation of 
topics from various disciplines (communication science, cognitive 
psychology, rhetoric, and epistemology).
In summary: it is clear from the content lists below that the range of 
thinking skills treated in IL textbooks (basically reasoning skills) form an 
important part o f the skills treated in CT textbooks. Because CT is a 
‘fuzzy’ enterprise, there are no ‘standard’ CT thinking skills. Skills which 
conceivably fall within the ambit o f ‘thinking’ (but not ‘reasoning’) are 
(inter alia) picking out false implications in advertisements, questioning 
exaggerated claims and resisting psychological appeals in advertisements, 
questioning ‘bias’ or slant in TV and audio news reporting, observation 
skills, problem solving skills, organizing skills, reporting skills, etc. It is 
interesting to note that skills associated with evaluating argument forms 
have been relegated to a few pages in the two books used for illustrative 
purposes below, and also in Diestler’s Becoming a C ritical Thinker 
(1994).
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V.E. B arry & J. Rudinow: 
Invitation to Critical Thinking 
(1990)
J. Chaffee:
Thinking Critically (1988)
Blocks to Critical Thinking Thinking
Communication: Language and 
Advertising; Television and the
Thinking Critically
News Solving Problems
The Anatomy of Arguments Perceiving
Casting Arguments Believing and Knowing
Missing Premises Language
Criticizing Arguments [various Forming Concepts
kinds of fallacies] Mapmaking and Composing
The Extended Argument Relating and Organizing
Writing the Argumentative Essay Reporting, Inferring, Judging
Solving Problems Constructing Arguments
Reasoning Critically 
[Generalization, causal reasoning, 
fallacies]
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5. Conclusion: Evaluation
The historical developments which I have sketched in broad strokes above 
can be graphically illustrated by an image o f concentric circles:
This image conveys some aspects o f the relations between the contexts in 
which ‘thinking skills’ have been elaborated by philosophers and logicians 
in the 20th century, but it can also be misleading to the extent that it 
suggests that FL and the skills associated with it forms the core o f IL and 
CT. This is not the case with regard to CT because valid forms of 
reasoning tend to receive scant attention in CT textbooks. Concentric 
circles also give the impression that demarcations between the different 
disciplines are clear cut. This is not the case especially with regard to IL 
and CT: therefore their ‘boundaries’ have been drawn with broken lines. 
CT is an eclectic affair (it is a moot question whether it is a ‘discipline’ in 
the conventional sense) which incorporates bits and pieces from FL, IL 
and disciplines such as communication science, cognitive psychology and 
rhetoric. The ‘fuzziness’ in the composition o f CT has certain advantages 
because, unlike FL, it can pragmatically annex ‘thinking skills’ from other
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disciplines as the need arises. A ‘fuzzy’, pragmatic approach to thinking 
skills encourages interdisciplinary contact and cooperation. However, a 
negative side to the ‘fiizziness’ o f CT is too much openness in the vein of 
‘anything goes’, which can lead to loss o f precision in the concept of 
thinking skills. A concept which comes to mean disparate things loses its 
ability to mean anything specific.
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